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ABSTRACT DAC
DCI
An electro-hydrostatic actuator was evaluated at
NASA Dryden Flight Research Center, Edwards, EHA
California. The primary goal of testing this actuator
system was the flight demonstration of power-by-wire °F
technology on a primary flight control surface. The FCC
electro-hydrostatic actuator uses an electric motor to FCS
drive a hydraulic pump and relies on local hydraulics
for force transmission. This actuator replaced the F- 18 FMET
standard left aileron actuator on the F-18 Systems FWT
Research Aircraft and was evaluated throughout the
Systems Research Aircraft flight envelope. As of g
July 24, 1997 the electro-hydrostatic actuator had H/W
accumulated 23.5 hours of flight time. This paper Hz
presents the electro-hydrostatic actuator system IBIT
configuration and component description, ground and
flight test plans, ground and flight test results, and Ibox
lessons learned. This actuator performs as well as the lbf
standard actuator and has more load capability than LMCS
required by aileron actuator specifications of
McDonnell-Douglas Aircraft, St. Louis, Missouri. The
electro-hydrostatic actuator system passed all of its LVDT
ground tests with the exception of one power-off test MCT
during unloaded dynamic cycling. MDA
NOMENCLATURE
MDC
MIL-STD-
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ADC analog to digital converter ms
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CPU computer processing unit PCME
digital to analog converter
Dynamic Controls, Incorporated,
Dayton, Ohio
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degree Fahrenheit
flight control computer
flight control system
failure mode and effects test
flightworthiness test procedure
gravity
hardware
Hertz
initiated built-in-test
interface box
pound-force
Lockheed-Martin Control Systems,
Johnson City, New York
linear variable differential transformer
Mos Control Thyristor
McDonnell-Douglas Aircraft, St. Louis,
Missouri
McDonnell-Douglas Corporation, Long
Beach, California
Response Multiplex Data Bus
(Military Standard)
milliseconds
millivolts
National Aeronautics and Space
Administration
power control and monitoring
PCU
PBW
ram
SOV
SRA
V
WPAFB
electronics
powerconversionunit
power-by-wire
shaftof theactuator
shutoffvalve(solenoidoperatedvalve)
SystemsResearchAircraft
voltage
Wright-PattersonAir ForceBase
INTRODUCTION
The F-18 SystemsResearchAircraft (SRA) [1],
(fig. 1), at the National Aeronauticsand Space
Administration(NASA) Dryden Flight Research
Center(DFRC)isa dual-purposet stbedbenefiting
both commercialand military developments.A
primary goal is to identify and flight test new
technologieson the SRA that will be beneficial
to subsonic, supersonic,hypersonic,or space
applications.Oneofthesetechnologiesi theelectro-
hydrostaticactuator(EHA) system,providedby
Wright-PattersonAir ForceBase(WPAFB),Dayton,
Ohio.UsingtheEHAeliminatesthecentralhydraulic
systemand reducescomplexity,maintenanceand
supportpersonnel.Thetwointerfaceboxes(Ibox)and
thepowerconversionunit(PCU)usedfor thesetests
wereprovidedby DynamicControls,Incorporated
(DCI), Dayton, Ohio. Lockheed-MartinControl
Systems(LMCS),JohnsonCity,NewYork,integrated
the actuator,motor,pump,andelectronics.Dowty
Aerospace,Duarte,California; Vickers,Jackson,
Mississippi; and Electromech,Wichita, Kansas,
providedtheactuator,pump,andelectricmotor.
Testingthe EHA systemdemonstratedin flight
power-by-wire(PBW)technologyonaprimaryflight
controlsurface.ForthistesttheEHA(fig.2) replaced
thestandardF-18left aileronactuatoron theSRA.
The flight test program consistedof several
maneuversthroughouttheSRAflightenvelope.This
reportpresentsEHAtestresultsduringthemaneuvers
andcomparesthemto thestandardaileronactuator.
Lessonslearnedduring ground testingare also
presented.
SYSTEM DESCRIPTION
The SRA was retrofitted with a larger left wing hinge
half to accommodate the larger size of the EHA
(fig. 3). Figure 4 shows the EHA integrated into the
left wing of the SRA.
The EHA system consists of the following elements:
• The electro-hydrostatic actuator (EHA)
• Two independent interface boxes (Ibox)
• One power control and monitoring electronics
(PCME) unit
• One power conversion unit (PCU)
• The pilot control panel located in the F- 18 SRA
cockpit
Figure 5 shows the interface of the EHA components
and the two flight control computers (FCC's). The
FCC's (FCC ch 1 and FCC ch 4) generate servo-
current position commands which are fed to the
Iboxes, one Ibox for each FCC channel. The Iboxes
receive the servocurrent position commands from the
FCC's, generate commands to the PCME and
generate a simulated feedback response to the FCC's.
The simulated feedback is used for loop closure and to
fool the FCC's into thinking that there is a standard
actuator on board. The PCME receives the command
signals generated by the Iboxes, then compares these
signals to verify that they are within a set limit and
averages them into a single command signal for the
EHA. The EHA feeds status and health information
back to the PCME to be used for fault detection. The
PCU provides the high power necessary to the EHA
through the PCME. Figure 6 shows the location of the
EHA system components in the SRA.
Two EHA systems sets, PCME and EHA, were
delivered to DFRC as a primary and a backup. The
sets were not interchangeable and they were classified
as set 1 and set 2. To meet performance requirements,
each EHA motor resolver had a specific calibration
constant, which was coded into the software of the
PCME. Therefore, the EHA and PCME were paired
together by the resolver calibration constant Thus,
replacing one of the units would require a software
modification to the PCME for the calibration constant
of the resolver.
The Electro-Hydrostatic Actuator
The EHA utilizes a single positive displacement
bidirectional bent-axis pump driven by a single three-
phase, permanent magnet motor. The motor direction
determines ram extension or retraction. The 41.5 lb
actuator is designed to require no active cooling. The
EHA contains a hydraulic fluid accumulator which is
packaged together with fluid components, and a
bypass shutoff valve (SOV). The hydraulic integrated
manifold contains two back-to-back check valves,
two cross-port pressure relief valves and the solenoid
operated shutoff valve with an internal damping
orifice. The two back-to-back check valves allow the
reservoir to replenish fluid in the balanced actuator
cylinder. Cross-port pressure relief valves are used to
protect the actuator, mounting structure, and aileron
surface from overpressure and overstress. The SOV
disengages the actuator ram from the motor and pump
assembly, reverts cycling the fluid through an orifice
from one side to the other of the balanced actuator
ram, to provide the trail-damped mode. The EHA also
uses a linear variable differential transformer (LVDT)
and a resolver for position feedback. It has a
temperature transducer and a pressure transducer for
status and health information used by the PCME. The
LVDT measures ram position, the temperature
transducer measures motor winding temperature, the
pressure transducer measures reservoir pressure, and
the resolver measures motor rotor position and
velocity.
The Power Control and Monitoring Electronics
The electronics required for controlling the power and
position commands to the EHA and the monitoring of
the actuator responses are located in the PCME unit
(fig. 7). The PCME is equipped with an 115 V ac
cooling fan and weighs approximately 20 lb. The
electronics monitoring provides continuous fault
monitoring and transfers the actuator to the trail-
damped mode when any failure is detected. The
PCME communicates with the SRA FCC's through
the two Iboxes. The inputs to the PCME provide
commands for actuator mode and position. These
actuator command signals are translated by the PCME
hardware and software into motor current commands
through appropriate control laws which enable the
actuator to be driven to its desired position. The
PCME is responsible for actuator position, motor
velocity, and current (acceleration) loop closures. In
addition, the PCME software provides BIT
capabilities to test the PCME computer hardware,
sensors, servoelectronics and actuator mechanics.
The PCME receives the high power +135 V dc from
the PCU and translates it to current commands for the
EHA through the Mos Controlled Thyristors (MCT).
Regenerative energy from the EHA is stored in
capacitors. Any excess regenerative energy is
dissipated through an external resistor bank.
The Interface Boxes
The Iboxes (fig. 8) provide the interface between the
F-18 FCCs and the EHA system. The Iboxes provide
the two FCC channels (FCC chl and FCC ch4) with
all the required loop closures. Two Iboxes are used,
one for each FCC channel. The Iboxes receive the
servocurrent position commands from the FCC's,
generate the commands to be sent to the PCME, and
generate the simulated feedback responses to the
FCC's. The Iboxes also provide monitoring of the
research actuator through the system and allow
research and performance data to be monitored
through a MIL-STD-1553 Response Multiplex Data
Bus (1553 data bus) [2].
The PCME reports health status of the EHA system to
the Iboxes. Once the Iboxes receive a failure, the
simulated position feedback to the FCC's recognize
open position feedback as a failure. Once the FCC's
recognize the failure, it de-energizes the SOV output
signal which causes the Iboxes to command the EHA
system into a trail-damped mode. The PCME also
de-energizes the SOV.
The Iboxes are designed to self-monitor internal
functions. Because there is no cross-channel
communications between the Iboxes, discrepancies
between the two channel position commands received
by the FCC's cannot be detected by the Iboxes.
Therefore, each Ibox splits the servocurrent position
commands into two redundant paths to generate
position command signals for the PCME. The two
command signals are compared and their differences
calculated. If the difference is not within a set limit a
failure is declared and the position feedbacks are
opened to the FCC's, transferring the EHA system to
the trail-damped mode. The Ibox self-monitoring
system includes failures of power supply, software
and central processing unit (CPU).
The Power Conversion Unit
The PCU (fig. 9) provides the +135Vdc, which
powers the EHA system. The PCU takes the 115 V ac,
400 Hz, three-phase F-18 aircraft power and converts
it to +135 V dc, which is delivered to the PCME. The
PCME then sends the high power through the MCT's
to the motor windings. The PCU is fused with two
35-amp fuses to protect the aircraft electrical systems
and EHA system.
The Pilot Control Panel
The pilot control panel contains control switches for
various experiments integrated into the SRA. Four
control push-button switches and a toggle switch are
allocated for the EHA system as follows (fig. 10).
• The lbox mode switch commands the EHA
system to be in Normal or Test mode, Normal
mode puts the system in normal operation mode
and Test mode is selected when performing an
aircraft flight control system (FCS) BIT.
• The IBIT button commands the EHA system
initiated BIT. IBIT is used by the PCME to
verify the failure logic used to monitor correct
operation of the EHA prior to aircraft takeoff
(weight-on-wheels is needed to invoke IBIT).
After a successful completion of IBIT the button
is lit to indicate a passed condition for the test.
• The reset button is used to reset the EHA system
after IBIT or a failure. The system only resets
with weight-on-wheels (aircraft on ground).
• The PCME BIT enable switch, in the off
position, prevents one Ibox from sending an
IBIT command to the PCME which prevents
initiating an IBIT on the ground. It is used as a
precaution to prevent an IBIT in flight.
• The left aileron disable switch allows the pilot to
actively de-energize the SOV valve and transfer
the EHA into a trail-damped mode.
GROUND TEST PLAN AND DESCRIPTION
The ground test plan includes the acceptance test
procedure (ATP) and flightworthiness test procedure
(FWT) conducted by LMCS. These procedures were
derived from the EHA statement of work produced
by WPAFB, which referenced the MDA aileron
actuator specification. The validation test procedures
conducted by DFRC were developed in response to
the requirements set up by the statement of work,
LMCS ATP, and FWT.
Testing by LMCS included electrical, mechanical,
and thermal testing necessary to qualify the EHA and
PCME in the F-18 environment. The EHA portion of
the testing also included pressure stresses. In addition
to the ATP and FWT, the PCME contained a preflight
and continuous built-in-test (BIT) to verify the system
operation.
Flightworthiness Test Plan
The flightworthiness test (FWT) plan covered the
environmental portion for the EHA system. This
test is a comprehensive one and ensures design
requirements are met for the EHA and PCME. The
FWT is comprised of the following tests:
• Altitude and rate of change
• Temperature (continuous, intermittent and
shock)
• Voltage power transients (28 V dc and 270 V dc)
• Vibration (resonance, sinusoidal and random)
• Impact shock
• Threshold and Linearity
• Endurance
• Limit load
• Output force
• Ultimate load
• Insulation resistance
• Nondestructive inspection
Validation test
The validation test objectives for the EHA were met
by fully integrating the system with the F- 18 Ironbird.
The F-18 Ironbird has hydraulically operated
horizontal stabilators, rudders and ailerons. Other
F-18 surfaces are simulated using analog actuator
models. The Ironbird also includes a test bench to
perform open-loop and stand-alone testing of the
FCC's. The validation test objectives consisted of a
functional test, continuous operation test, frequency
and rate limit test, and the failure mode and effects
test (FMET).
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Functional test--The functional test confirmed the
following operations of the EHA system:
• Perform a successful EHA reset
• Perform EHA BIT successfully multiple times
and consecutively
• Perform full-up and full-down commands
successfully
• Perform aircraft RIG mode operation
successfully
• Perform EPAD BIT in all flap settings
successfully
• Perform aircraft FCS IBIT and Test Group 10
BIT successfully
• Perform hardware simulation and data
recording functional checks
Continuous test--The continuous test ensured that
the EHA system operated under normal conditions
for an extended period of time. The test consisted of
operating the EHA for five (5) 1-hour segments at
0.3 Hz sinusoidal and are listed as follows:
• Amplitude of 50 percent of full stroke
• Aileron biased at 6 ° up
• Aileron biased at 0 ° deflection
• Flap switch set at half-flap setting (30 ° down)
• Flap switch set at Up/Auto setting (0 °)
Amplitude for some of the tests listed were adjusted
to clear the stops of the actuator.
Frequency response and rate limit test--The
frequency response test was conducted to obtain
open-loop and closed-loop response of the left (EHA)
and right (standard actuator) ailerons. The
requirement is that the difference between the left and
right ailerons should not exceed 0.5 dB in gain and 5 °
in phase. The open- and closed-loop frequency
response test was performed using the small
amplitude log sweep at 5 percent of full stroke
command over a frequency range from 0.1 Hz to
15 Hz. The rate limit test was performed with the
EHA system using a square wave input sweep with
an amplitude of 95 percent of full scale with a
constant frequency of 0.1 Hz.
Failure modes and effects test--The purpose of
FMET is to obtain failure mode responses and effects
of failures on the EHA system. The FMET test
consisted of actuator signal management failures,
cockpit signal management failures and power
failures during a simulated test condition. The
actuator signal management failures consisted of
interrupting signals upstream and downstream of
Iboxes, and verifying that the EHA fails to a trail-
damped mode during a simulated flight condition.
The cockpit signal management failures included
inhibiting individual discrete signals during a
simulated flight condition at different flap settings.
The power failures consisted of interrupting power to
components during a simulated flight condition.
Actuator signal management upstream of Iboxes.
Failures for the actuator signal management upstream
of Iboxes consisted of interrupting the following
signals at a simulated condition of Mach 0.6, at an
altitude of 25,000 ft during an aileron reversal, and
verifying EHA fails to a trail-damped mode on
channels 1 and 4:
• Left aileron command
• Left Aileron LVDTexcitation
• Left Aileron SOV
• Left Aileron pressure switch
• Left Aileron ram position
• Biasing aileron command
Actuator signal management downstream of Iboxes.
For the actuator signal management downstream of
Iboxes, failures consisted of interrupting the
following signals at a simulated flight condition of
Mach 0.6, at an altitude of 25,000 ft during an aileron
reversal, while verifying EHA fails to a trail-damped
mode on channels 1 and 4:
• Position command
• Biasing position command
• Position command PCME fault tolerance
detection
• Shutoff of actuator
• Position command fail
• Fail-safe mode
Cockpit Signal Management. The cockpit signal
management failures include inhibiting individual
discrete signals at a simulated level flight of 160 kn
andanaltitudeof 25,000ft. Therequirementsareto
(I) verify EHA fails to a trail-dampedmodewhen
commandedbythedisableswitch,(2)verifytheEHA
systemdoes not reset throughthe resetswitch,
(3)verify theEHA systemdoesnotperforma BIT
throughtheEHAIBIT switch,and(4)verifyIBIT is
notperformedwithoutweight-on-wheelsdi cretes.
Component Power Failures. The power failures tests
consisted of interrupting power to the following
components at a simulated flight condition of
Mach 0.6 and an altitude of 25,000 ft during an
aileron reversal while verifying EHA fails to a trail-
damped mode: (1) Iboxes, (2) PCME, (3) High power
to PCME through PCU, and (4) High power to
actuator (all motor windings).
FLIGHT TEST DESCRIPTION
A test matrix was developed after the ground test
demonstrated that the EHA meets standard F-18
aileron actuator requirements. The test points were
devised using the F-18 simulation to map the F-18
envelope with q-bar and aileron hinge moment as the
primary variables. The flight test matrix was broken
into the following three phases, functional checks,
envelope mapping and mission profiles and were
flown in that order. All three flight test phases
performed the following maneuvers; doublets,
windup turns, aileron reversals, straight and level
turns, lateral frequency sweeps, and aerobatic
maneuvers. A gradual hinge-moment buildup
approach was used in testing the EHA. Each phase of
flight test was completed by conducting the
maneuvers with medium-rate half-stick inputs and
evaluating the performance of the EHA. A visual
inspection of the EHA was performed between the
first three flights. Upon completing the first three
phases of flights, evaluating the data, and verifying by
visual inspection that no anomalies were found on the
EHA; the phases of flights were repeated conducting
the maneuvers with abrupt full-stick inputs. The EHA
was required to complete 25 hours of flight time. The
functional checks phase was flown at a safe altitude of
25,000 ft and mach 0.4. The envelope mapping phase
of flights included altitudes of 10,000 ft, 20,000 ft,
35,000 ft and 40,000 ft with roach numbers ranging
from 0.54 to 1.6. The mission profiles phase included
the following aerobatic maneuvers; Wingover, Barrel
Roll, Aileron Roll, 4-Point Roll, 8-Point Roll, Split S,
Loop, Immelman, Cloverleaf, Cuban 8 and the
Chinese Immelman.
TEST RESULTS
Ground and flight test results are described next.
Tables and figures are used to more clearly delineate
results.
Ground Test Results
The EHA successfully passed the ATP, FWT, and
validation tests (functional, continuous and
frequency). Table 1 through 4 illustrate requirements
and test results. Figure 11 shows that the EHA and
standard open-loop frequency are within MDA
aileron small amplitude specification limits. Figure 12
shows that the EHA tracks closely to the standard
actuator in the open-loop frequency response.
The FMET tests and results are presented in tables 5
through 8. The EHA system successfully passed all
FMET tests with the exception of one of the power
failures (table 8). The power failures were devised to
be tested during an in-flight (simulation) dynamic
maneuver (aileron reversal). During the 28Vdc
power failure test of the PCME, the EHA system went
to a trail-damped mode as designed, but the power
transient caused damage to the MCT's. Results from
troubleshooting indicated that the inverter drive using
the MCT's was sensitive to loss of 28 V dc power
transients during dynamic cycling of the aileron
(loaded and unloaded). The same test was conducted
previously with a static actuator (uncommanded) and
it did not damage any MCT's in the PCME. The
cycling rate threshold that caused the failure was not
determined. No correction was incorporated into the
hardware and the MCT failure was accepted as a low
probability and severity risk.
Flight Test Results
The EHA has successfully flown on the SRA since
January 1997, and as of July 24, 1997 it has
accumulated 23.5 hours of flight time. Table 9
summarizes the first five flights, which include the in-
flight failures and their causes.
The first EHA (set 1) flight took place on
January 16, 1996, on flight 564. Approximately 9 min
into the flight, the EHA system went into a trail-
damped mode as designed. The SRA landed safely
without extra effort from the pilot. Set 1 was qualified
by similarity because it had completed and passed the
ATP and validation testing. Set 1 environmental
testing was waived since the second EHA system
(set2) had completedand passedenvironmental
testing.Duringtroubleshootingof thein-flightfailure,
it wasfoundthatthePCMEwouldnotdetectanopen
motorphaseduringnormaloperationmode.Anopen
motorphaseis detectedby thepreflightBIT. Open
motorphasefailuredetectionwasincorporatedin the
PCME software. In addition, load tests were
performedtoquantifytheeffectofopenphasestothe
dynamicstiffnessof the actuationsystem.It was
determinedthat the EHA would have sufficient
dynamicstiffnesswithoneopenphase.
ThesecondEHA system(set2) wasfirst flownon
November4, 1996,on flight 583 andsuccessfully
completedaircraft functionalflight checks.The
secondflightwasflownonNovember12,1996,on
flight584andincludedanaircraftenginecyclingtest.
Theenginecyclingtestrequiresanengineshutdown
andrestartin flight. Duringthefirstengineshutdown
(right engine)the EHA systemwent into a trail-
dampedmode. Thecauseof the EHA in-flight
shutdownwasapowersurgecausedbyswitchingto
theleftgenerator,becausetherightengineiscoupled
with the right generator.During this generator
transition(less than 50 ms) the powersurgeis
propagatedthroughthe28V dccontrolpowerto the
PCME.The MCT's in the PCMEweredamaged
becauseof the powersurgeduringenginepower
down.A powersurgefilteringcircuitwasinstalledon
the 28V dc powerto thePCMEto reducepower
transientstothePCMEduringengineshutdowns.
While set2 wasbeingrepaired,set 1(qualifiedby
similarity)wasinstalledin theaircraft.Thecauseof
theflight564failurewassuspectedto bethelossof
28V dc powerin the powersupplyinternalto the
PCME.All componentsof thepowersupplywere
testedandno anomalieswerefound. A vibration
problemwasspeculatedto bethecause,soset1was
vibratedtotheworst-caseaxis.Thisvibrationtestdid
not reproducethe failure. Set 1 was reflownon
January10, 1997,on flight 585 andshortlyafter
takeoffthe EHA systemwent into a trail-damped
mode. Thefailuresof set1for thetwoflights,564
and585,werecorrelatedto altitude.Both in-flight
failuresoccurredat an altitudeof slightly above
11,000ft. Thefailurewasreproducedin analtitude
chamberand the causeof the shutdownwas
determinedto bearcing. The leadsin thepower
supplywouldarcto acircuitboardlocatedabovethe
powersupplyat higheraltitudes.The arcingwas
stoppedby addingalayerof captontapebetweenthe
leadsandthecircuitboard.
Figure 13 and 14 showthe in-flight failuresof
flight564and585,respectively.Trace1showshow
theEHApositionfeedbackdepartsfromtheaverage
positioncommandatthetimeof failure.Theaverage
positioncommandisdesignedto moveto apositive
t.9 volts,hardoverdown,oncetheEHA systemhas
failed.Thishardoverdowncommanduringafailure
wasincorporatedtominimizethedifferentialbetween
theaileronsin casethe EHA systeminadvertently
camebackonline,particularlywhenthe aircraftis
closeto theground.TheEHA is in a trail-damped
modeonceafailurehasbeendetected.Trace2,with
the standardactuatoraileronpositioninvertedand
trim removed,is plottedagainstthe EHA aileron
position. As illustrated,theEHA positiondeparts
fromstandardactuatorpositionatthetimeof failure
asit failsto a trail-dampedmode.Trace3 illustrates
SRAaltitudeatthetimeof failure.
Set2 wasintegratedinto theSRAagainandbegan
flyingonJanuary16,1997withmediumrateinputs.
As of July 24, 1997,the EHA system,set 2, had
completed24flights[3] totaling23.5hoursof flight
timeandhasflownflawlessly.Table10illustratesthe
maximumandminimumtemperaturesthePCMEand
EHAexperiencedandthemaximumhingemoment
measured.
Figure15through18showtypicaltestmaneuvers.
Trace 1 illustratestrackingof the EHA position
feedbackwith theaveragepositioncommand.The
timelag between command and feedback is
approximately30 ms and is associatedwith data
sampling.In trace2 the standardactuatoraileron
positionis invertedandtrim is removed,andthen
plottedagainstheEHA aileronposition.Herethe
EHA performsas well as the standardactuator.
Trace3 showsthe EHA hingemoment,a negative
hingemomentputs the actuatorin tensionand a
positive hinge moment puts the actuator in
compression.Figures19 and 20 illustratethe test
pointswherethe EHA actuatorstalled.Figure21
showsatestpointwherethestandardactuatorstalled
andtheEHAdid not.
CONCLUDINGREMARKS
The ground test procedures were conducted to verify
that the electro-hydrostatic actuator and the power
control and monitoring electronicscomponents
met design requirementsand were qualifiedas
flightworthyfor theF-18aircraft.
Thegroundtestingphasepointedout thattheMos
ControlThyristorswhichareusedfor powercontrol
in thepowercontrolandmonitoringelectronicsunit,
aresensitiveto a lossof 28V dc powertransients
duringdynamiccyclingof theactuator(loadedand
unloaded).Mos Control Thyristor'sare a new
technologyand the manufacturerdid not have
sufficientestdatato characterizetheperformanceof
them.
Theflight testplanwasdevisedto testandevaluate
theelectro-hydrostatica tuatorperformancethrough-
out the F-18 SystemsResearchAircraft flight
envelope.The electro-hydrostaticactuatorposition
feedbacktrackedwellwiththepositioncommandand
thesystemhasflownflawlesslysincetheadditionof
the28V dcpowersurgefilter to thepowercontrol
and monitoringelectronicsunit. The electro-
hydrostaticactuatordid stall twice,asexpected,at
high hingemomentmaneuverswheretheexternal
loadwasgreaterthanthemaximumoutputload.The
electro-hydrostatica tuatorappearstohavemoreload
capabilitythanrequiredby actuatorspecifications,
andhasperformedaswell asthestandardactuator
throughoutthe envelopeof the F-18 Systems
ResearchAircraft. Generalperformanceof the
electro-hydrostaticactuatoris good.The fail-safe
designandtrail-dampedmodeworkedwellafterthree
in-flight failureswereencountered.Pilots indicate
thatflyingwithanelectro-hydrostatica tuatoronthe
F-18SystemsResearchAircraftfeelsthesameasif a
standardactuatorwereonboard.
LESSONS LEARNED
The following lessons were learned throughout the
EHA system program.
Controller to actuator interchangeabilit3,: In order to
meet position accuracy requirements, the system is
calibrated as a controller and actuator set. Two sets
were provided to DFRC for testing, a primary set and
a backup set. Thus, the units are not interchangeable.
Replacing any one of the units requires a software
modification to the calibration constant of the motor
resolver. Software management is an issue, especially
developing acceptable tests to prove system
functionality, confirm successful software loading,
and minimum acceptance criteria. It would have been
beneficial to the program to have interchangeable
units.
Open phase detection: The PCME detected an open
phase during the pre-flight BIT on the ground but did
not detect an open phase to the actuator during normal
operation. A design modification was required to
provide continuous detection on an open motor phase.
In addition, load tests were performed to quantify the
effect of open phases to the dynamic stiffness of the
actuation system. It was determined that the EHA
would have sufficient dynamic stiffness with one open
phase. It is recommended that input and output power
paths of all components be tested.
Avionics power transients: Transients in avionics
28 V dc power may result in damage of the MCT's.
There were two contributing factors in the analysis of
this failure. First, the avionics 28 Vdc power and the
270V dc actuator control power were completely
isolated, which resulted in a hot 270 V dc bus during
the avionics 28 V dc power failure tests. Second, the
MCT's, which uses avionics power, did not ensure a
fail-safe position of switching cells with loss of the
28 V dc power gate drive. As a result, the cells could
short the 270Vdc buses and damage controller
hardware (MCT's). A power surge filtering circuit was
incorporated to handle the control power of the MCT
as backup devices to handle temporary power spikes
or surges. Our experience with the MCT indicated
that they are sensitive to power surges and that they
require constant non-interruptible control power. The
PCME was designed with the understanding that the
28 V dc was on a non-interruptible (battery backed-
up) bus. The 28 Vdc bus in the aircraft is backed up
with a battery, but the switching time to the battery or
good generator (of less than 50 ms) was not pointed
out in the design requirements.
Flight qualified by similari_: Two in-flight failures
were experienced because the PCME set 1 was
qualified by similarity. All tests were completed on
set 1 with the exception of the environmental test. In
addition to necessary tests, when qualifying
components by similarity it is recommended to
include environmental tests that reveal workmanship
variationsor provideathoroughdetailedcomponent
specificationset of documentsand inspection
processes,onon-conformingpartsorprocesseswill
beevident.
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Table1.Electro-hydrostatica tuatoracceptancet stprocedureresults.
PCMEand
Parameter Units Requirement actuatorresults
Actuator sensor BIT actuator shutdown at sensors passed
shorted/grounded
Position command ch 1 = ch 2 = 0 + 50
match mv ch 1 cmd = 0 passed
mismatch V ch 4 cmd = +2.1 passed
& ch 4 cmd = +1.9
Bus voltage too low (270 V) V Vbus=190 +10 passed
Demand BIT pass BIT passed
Hot/cold temp test of PCME
at -40 °C Perform BIT and normal passed
at 71 °C operation for 2 min passed
Output stall force lbf 13107 +500 13300
sec 10 minimum > 30 minimum
Steady load lbf 5000 +500 5100
min 20 minimum > 20 minimum
Ram output stroke in. (mechanical) +2.25 +2.25
in. (electrical) +2.19 +2.19
No load ram velocity in./sec 6.7 minimum 7.7 minimum
Load vs rate
load lbf 6329 6329
rate in./sec 4.88 minimum 6.0 minimum
Frequency response
+0.5 percent command Hz/dB/deg. 7/-7.25/92 maximum 7/-3.272/66
+5.0 percent command Hz/dB/deg. 7/-7.25/92 maximum 7/-3.27/65
Hysteresis percent of full stroke 0.1 0.080
Threshold percent of full stroke 0.05 0.0375
Linearity percent of full stroke +0.5 +0.1875
Dynamic stiffness lbf/in. 270,000 minimum 282,000
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Table2.Flightworthinesstestresults.*
Parameter Units Requirement
Altitude ft 70,000
Rateof change ft/min 40,000
Temperature
Continuous °F -40 to 160
Intermittent °F 18010rain
Shock °F -40 to 160
Inputpowervariations
28V dctransients V MIL-STD-71M[4]
28V dcsteadyand V
rippletest Hz MIL-STD-704[4]
270V dctransient V MIL-STD-704[4]
Vibration(eachaxis) perMDCA3376
Resonantsurvey Hz 5to2000
Dwellatresonance Hz 44.8& 49.8
SineCycling Hz 5to 50to 5
Random Hz 50to 2000
Shock(eachaxis)
half-sine
g g 20-z,15x andy,EHA
g 35-z,15x andy,PCME
time msec 11
Threshold in. firstmotionnotto exceed
0.002in.command
Linearity percentof _+0.5
full stroke
Endurance cycles
Limit load
25°up lbf
0° neutral lbf
45° down lbf
Outputforce
Compression lbf
Tension lbf
Ultimateload
25°up lbf
0° neutral lbf
45° down lbf
500,000
12,093(compression)
15,800(tension)
13,106.67(tension)
12,093for 10sec
13,106.67for 10sec
18,140(compression)
23,700(tension)
19,660(tension)
*PCMEandEHA,passed.
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Table3:Validationfunctionaltestresults.*
Parameter Requirement
EPAD-reset Multipletimes
EPADBIT(Up/Auto) Multipletimes
Commands
Fullup,deg 25
Fulldown,deg 42
A/CRigMode Nofailures
EHABIT
Halfflaps Nofailures
Fullflaps Nofailures
A/CFCSIBIT Nofailures
A/Ctestgroup10BIT Nofailures
*PCME and EHA, passed.
Table 4. Validation continuous test results.*
Parameter Requirement
0.3 Hz sinusoidal at
Amplitude
Aileron biased
Aileron Biased
Half-Flap
Up/Auto
50 percent of full stroke (- stack)
6 ° up
0 °
-30 ° down
~0 °
*PCME and EHA, passed.
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Table5:ValidationFMETresults(failureupstreamof Iboxes).*
Parameter Requirement
Interruptcommand
channel1 Open
channel4 Open
InterruptLVDTexc.
channel1 Open
channel4 Open
InterruptSOV
channel1 Open
channel4 Open
Interruptpressureswitch
channel1 Open
channel4 Open
Interruptramposition
channel1 Open
channel4 Open
Biascommand
channel1 +8 percent of command
channel 4 _+8percent of command
*PCME and EHA, passed.
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Table6:ValidationFMETresults(failuredownstreamof Iboxes).*
Parameter Requirement
Interruptcommand
channel1
channel4
InterruptPCMEfault
tolerancedetection
channel1
channel4
InterruptSOV
channel1
channel4
Interruptcommandfail
channel1
channel4
Interruptfailsafemode
channell
channel4
Biascommand
channell
channel4
Open
Open
Open
Open
Open
Open
Open
Open
Open
Open
+8 percent of command
+8 percent of command
*PCMEand EHA, passed.
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Table7:FMETvalidationcockpitsignalsfailures.*
Parameter Requirement
Inhibitdiscretesignals
ofdisableswitch
Inhibit1 Open
Inhibit2 Open
Inhibit1& 2 Open
Inhibitdiscretesignalsof
resetswitch
Inhibit1 Open
Inhibit2 Open
Inhibitdiscretesignalsof
IBIT switch Inhibit1Open
Inhibit2Open
*PCMEandEHA,passed.
Table8:ValidationFMETPowerfailures.
PCMEandactuator
Parameter Requirement results
InterruptPower
Ibox1 Remove28V dc Passed
Ibox4 Remove28V dc Passed
InterruptPower
PCME Remove28V dc Passed(staticEHA)
Failed(cyclingEHA)
InterruptPower
PCU Remove_.+135V dc Passed
InterruptPower
EHAwindings Remove+135 V dc Passed
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Table9:Flighttestsummary.
Flight EHA/PCME
Date number hardware,set Failure
1-16-96 564 ! Powersupplyarcsabove11,000ft causingMCT
damageinPCME.
11-4-96 583 2
11-12-96 584 2
1-10-97 585 1
1-16-97 586 2
None
Powertransientduringin-flightengineshutdown
causedMCTdamagein thePCME
Powersupplyarcsabove11,000ft causingMCT
damageinPCME.Sameasthein-flightfailurein
flight564.
(NoFailureshavebeenencounteredtodatesince
thisflight.)None.
Table10:Flightresults.
Parameter Result FlightCondition
WarmestTemperature
EHA 35°C
PCME 44°C
ColdestTemperature
EHA 1.25°C
PCME - 1.77°C
HighestHingeMoment 57,300in-ibf
Mach0.42,Altitude25,000ft
Mach0.7,Altitude25,000ft
Priortotakeoff
Mach0.6,Altitude25,000ft
Mach1.6,Altitude35,000ft, q-bar890lbf/ft2
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Figure 1. Systems Research Aircraft (SRA).
EC93 42065-06
Source: Lockheed Martin Control Systems, Johnson City, New York
Figure 2. Electro-hydrostatic actuator (EHA).
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Figure 3. Hinge half housing.
@
®
EC97 43875-02
Figure 4. Electro-hydrostatic actuator installed in SRA.
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Figure 5. Systems Research Aircraft system architecture.
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970874
970e_ j
Figure 6. Electro-hydrostatic actuator system component locations on SRA.
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EC93-41023-03
Figure 7. Power control and monitoring electronics (PCME).
EC93 41023-09
Figure 8. Interface box (Ibox).
2O
EC9343334-01
Figure9.Powerconversionunit(PCU).
_ INSTR TM1 _ TM2 UPLINK EVENT(
TAPE
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Or_'_3_'_ _ FADS FADS ACT _ IBOX FIBOX/ACT-1
RESET POWER POWER MOOE IBIT
OF
ARTS ARTS _ PCME BIT ZEROPOWER RESET ENABLE CAL
Figure 10. Electro-hydrostatic actuator disable switch and control panel in cockpit.
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Figure l I. Electro-hydrostatic actuator and standard actuator open-loop small amplitude frequency response.
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Figure 12. Electro-hydrostatic actuator and standard actuator closed-loop small amplitude frequency response.
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Figure 13. In-flight failure, January 16, 1996, flight 564.
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Figure 14. In-flight failure, January 10, 1997, flight 585.
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Figure 17. Windup turn to 20 ° c_.
M=0.83, altitude=25,000 ft, q-bar=376 lbf/ft 2.
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Figure 18. Abrupt aileron reversal--full stick (left).
M=0.84, altitude=25,000 ft, q-bar=-382 Ibf/ft 2.
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Figure 19. Aileron reversal--half stick (left).
M= 1.58, altitude=34,000 ft, q-bar=890 lbf/ft 2.
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Figure 20. Abrupt aileron reversal--full stick (right).
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